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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/07/2011 Accident number: 766 
Accident time: 08:30 Accident Date: 03/04/2007 
Where it occurred: CBU site 203, 
Batoulay, Ej-Jenoub, 
Area 7 
Country: Lebanon 
Primary cause: Inadequate survey (?) Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 03/04/2007 
ID original source: 003/07 Name of source: UN MACC SL 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: M77 submunition Ground condition: agricultural (recent) 
leaf litter 
soft 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 15/07/2011 
No of victims: 0 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: UTM: 707270 - 
3679376 
Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate area marking (?) 
inadequate survey (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
non injurious accident (?) 
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Accident report 
A report of this “missed-mine” incident was made available in 2008. At that time it was not 
included in the DDAS because there were no injuries involved. It has been included now 
because it seems that there are lessons to be learned from it. 
The conversion of the original report into a DDAS file has led to some of the formatting being 
lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. The report is reproduced below, edited for 
anonymity. 
 
MINE ACTION COORDINATION CENTRE, SOUTHERN LEBANON 
MINE INCIDENT REPORT 003/2007 
Report on the BAC INCIDENT that occurred on the 03rd April 2007 in which an M77 Sub-
Munitions was located adjacent to CBU site 203. 
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT FOR MINE INCIDENT IN BATOULAY - 03 April 
2007, No 003/07 
1. GENERAL 
Date: 03 April 2007 
Time of Incident: 0830 hrs approx. 
Location: Batoulay, Ej-Jenoub, Area 7, Lebanon 
Nearest Task: CBU-203, Task Dossier 7-002 
UTM of Task: 707270 – 3679376 
Task Start / Finish Date: 17 Oct 06 / 21 Dec 06 
Reported by: [Name removed] (03-746042) Farmer (land owner). 
Reported to: [Name removed], MACC SL Community Liaison Assistant. 
Time of Incident report to MACC QA: 1000hrs approx. 
MA Organisation POC: [Name removed], [Demining group] Demining Supervisor. 
Investigation Date/Time: 03 April 07, 1040hrs  
Investigation Location: Task CBU-203 
Investigation Team: Capt [Name removed], LAF Operations Officer and [Name removed], 
MACC SL QA Officer. 
Explosive Ordnance Type: US M-77 Submunition  
2. DETAILS OF INCIDENT 
On 03 April 2007, one M-77 Submunition was located by a local farmer while harvesting his 
orange orchard and banana plantation, in the vicinity of Task CBU-203, which had been 
completed by [Demining group] using sub-surface Battle Area Clearance (BAC) procedures. 
The farmer reported the find to [Name removed], MACC SL Community Liaison Assistant.  
After receiving information from the local farmer, [Name removed] and [Name removed], 
MACC SL Operations Officer visited the incident site to conduct a preliminary investigation. In 
addition, [Name removed], [Demining group] TFM, arrived at the site to liaise with MACC SL 
personnel. It was not possible at this stage to confirm whether the item was in a [Demining 
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group] cleared area within CBU-203 or not. After meeting with the farmer and confirming the 
information, the item was marked, photographed and the farmer was requested to remain 
outside the orchard pending further investigation. The incident was reported to [Name 
removed], MACC SL Operations Officer who, together with Capt [Name removed], LAF 
Operations Officer, was conducting Accreditation of [Demining group] BAC personnel in the 
area at the time.  
At 1030hrs on 03 April 2007, a subsequent investigation was conducted by Capt [Name 
removed] and [Name removed]. The investigation team was accompanied by [Name 
removed], [Demining group] Demining Supervisor, [Name removed], [Name removed], 
[Demining group] TFM and [Demining group] BAC Team 8 Supervisor, who had worked at 
task CBU-203. After confirming the location and type of Explosive Ordnance, the MACC SL 
personnel requested for the Task completion report (map and coordinates), a compass and 
tape measure in order to try and identify the perimeter turning points and confirm whether the 
item was within the cleared area or not.  
Evidence 
The ground was flat, comprising soft soil and covered with banana and orange trees. There 
was evidence of harvesting and areas had been excavated / cultivated.  
The M-77 was on the surface positioned on its side. The submunition was complete with the 
ribbon attached and some remains of paper tape were attached around the fuze collar. Three 
wooden pickets and hazardous marking tape were positioned around the item to mark its 
location.  
In order to determine the exact location of the M-77 it was necessary to utilize the completion 
report map / coordinates, compass and measuring tape to identify the task perimeter. Using 
the completion report cleared area perimeter coordinates it was possible to navigate from the 
Start Point with some accuracy using the compass and measuring tape. The location of the 
Start Point and Turning Point (TP) 1 were each marked with a metal picket sunk in the 
ground. It was not possible to locate the metal pickets which had been used to mark Turning 
Points 2 and 3 however; the approximate location was identified using the compass and 
measuring tape. The distance and bearing from TPs 2 and 3 to the M-77 were as follows: 
TP 2 – M-77 = 346˚ / 24.4 m: TP 3 – M-77 = 186˚ / 24 m 
Interview with [Name removed], [Demining group] TFM 
[Name removed] informed that the farmer had discovered the submunition in the morning of 
03 April 2007, while harvesting his banana trees and had subsequently reported this to the 
MACC SL.  
Interview with [Name removed], [Demining group] Demining Supervisor 
[Name removed] confirmed the clearance procedures conducted at task 203 and said that he 
believed the M-77 to be outside the [Demining group] cleared area (CBU-203 perimeter).  
Background 
CBU-203 is located within a banana plantation near Batoulay. According to information 
received from [Demining group] during a previous investigation on 14 March 2007, rocket 
attacks resulting in a high level of M-77 submunition contamination.    
[Demining group] commenced BAC operations at CBU-203 on 17 October 2006. Initially is 
was planned for surface clearance to be conducted, however, after an assessment was made 
by [Demining group] and MACC SL operations, it was decided that there was a requirement 
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for sub-surface clearance. The decision was based on evidence that there was a high 
probability of sub-surface submunitions. The evidence was as follows: 
The local farmer (land owner) reported that 4-500 submunitions had been removed by the 
local population from the plantation. 
The submunitions had been dispensed at a low height from the cluster bomb unit (CBU) and 
therefore, landed at a higher velocity than usual.   
The soil in the plantation was extremely soft at the time. 
The plantation was a sparsely vegetated at the time of the attack.      
CBU-203 was completed by [Demining group] on 21 December 2006 and a QA Completion 
Survey conducted by the MACC SL at the task on 14 February 2007.  
CBU-77 and CBU-359 to the west of CBU-203 are also included in Task dossier 7-002. CBU-
359 has been completed by [Demining group] and CBU-77 is a current [Demining group] task. 
There are uncleared areas between CBU-203 and the fore mentioned tasks. 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
On 03 April 2007, a local farmer discovered an M-77 submunition while harvesting his orange 
orchard and banana tree plantation.  
The M-77 was on the surface with remnants of paper tape around the fuze collar. 
International Mine Action Organisations operating in Lebanon generally use plastic tape when 
rendering safe (gagging) submunitions therefore, it unlikely that the tape had been placed by 
them.  
 
According to the navigation conducted during the investigation, the M-77 is located to the 
west and outside task CBU-203 cleared area.  
It is of the MACC SL investigation team’s opinion that the M-77 was not discovered within 
Task CBU-203 cleared area and therefore, not missed during [Demining group] clearance 
operations of CBU-203.  
4. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER ACTIONS 
The M-77 is disposed of as a matter of urgency. [Name removed] has confirmed that 
[Demining group] will destroy the item in situation the same day. 
Area reduction should be conducted in the immediate area of the M-77 to confirm whether 
there are additional submunitions. Surface BAC should be conducted out to a minimum 
distance of 25 metres from the item creating a 50 x 50 metre (50m2) box and or up to the 
perimeter of CBU-203 perimeter, whichever, is the greatest. It is recommended that due to 
the proximity of their current operations, [Demining group] be requested to conduct this. 
There may be a requirement for additional clearance of areas between CBU-203, 359 and 77. 
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5. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
03 April 2007 
0830 Approx: [Name removed], a local farmer discovered an M-77 close to CBU-203 and 
reported it to the MACC SL MAG. 
0930 Approx: [Name removed], MACC SL Community Liaison Assistant and [Name 
removed], MACC SL Operations Officer confirmed the information and marked the item at 
CBU-203. 
1040: Capt [Name removed], LAF Operations Officer and [Name removed], MACC SL QA 
Officer commended investigation of incident site. 
1230: Investigation completed. 
6. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
See the following: 
 
Photograph of Incident Site 
 
Report Written By: Capt. [Name removed], LAF Operations Officer, [Name removed]  MACC 
SL QA Officer, 03 April 2007 
1. Comments by the MACC SL Chief of QA 
I have reviewed the approve investigation report and concur with the conclusions and 
recommendations. 
[Name removed], UN Chief of QA, MACC SL 
2. Comments by the MACC SL Chief of Operations 
Seen/Agreed  
[Name removed], UN Chief of Operations, MACC SL 
3. Comments by the MACC SL Programme Manager 
Seen/Agreed  
[Name removed], UN Programme Manager, MACC SL 
4. Comments by the NDO Representative to MACC SL  
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Seen/Agreed  
[Name removed], NDO Representative, MACC SL  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this incident is listed as “Inadequate survey” because the item was 
found on the boundary of a cleared area, so the hazardous area should have extended 
further. The secondary cause is listed as a “Management control inadequacy” because the 
demining group’s perimeter marking had been so poor that it could not be found five months 
after leaving the site (it is intended to be “permanent”). This made it impossible for the 
investigators to be certain whether the submunition had been found inside the searched area 
or not. The use of appropriate marking systems is a management responsibility. 
The presence of “gagging” tape around the neck of an obvious submunition found on the 
surface implies that it had been found and moved by someone – perhaps to discredit the 
demining group – and this may explain why the investigators did not criticise the demining 
group about its inadequate perimeter marking. 
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